School Accountability: Can We Reward Schools and Avoid Pupil Selection? * School accountability schemes require measures of school performance, and these measures are in practice often based on pupil test scores. It is well-known that insufficiently correcting these test scores for pupil characteristics may provide incentives for inefficient pupil selection. We show that the trade-off between reward and pupil selection is not only a matter of sufficient information. A school accountability scheme that rewards school performance will create incentives for pupil selection, even under perfect information, unless the educational production function satisfies an (unrealistic) separability assumption. We propose different compromise solutions and discuss the resulting incentives in theory. The empirical relevance of our analysis -i.e., the rejection of the separability assumption and the magnitude of the incentives in the different compromise solutions -is illustrated with Flemish data.
Introduction
Public education used to have some common features around the world. Schools often received funding per pupil and had limited autonomy, inspectors controlled the quality of education, and school choice by parents was often restricted.
Critics argued that these features explained the poor performance of (some) public schools.
School accountability increased in several countries to improve student learning. In the U.S., for example, the 'No Child Left Behind Act of 2001' forced all states to set up an accountability system for public schools. In some states schools had to publish report cards-information about their performance based on pupil test scores-to inform parental school choice. Other states used bonuses or sanctions depending on school performance. School accountability improved pupil test scores, but it is unclear whether explicit …nancial bonuses and sanctions are necessary (Wössmann, In this paper we focus on another strategic reaction of schools, pupil selection. The average test score in a school strongly depends on the characteristics of the pupil population. Insu¢ ciently correcting for pupil characteristics may lead to a biased evaluation of school performance (Meyer, 1997; Ladd and Walsh, 2002; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003; Taylor and Nguyen, 2006; Neal, 2008) .
Moreover, it can seduce schools to appear more attractive for speci…c student groups. Pupil selection may then improve the measured performance of a school without adding real skills.
In this paper we focus on school …nancing schemes, but the question is equally relevant for the design of report cards. 1 In section 2 we show that it is possible to devise a school …nancing scheme that rewards higher average test scores without creating incentives for pupil selection, but only if the educational 1 It could also be relevant for the design of di¤erentiated vouchers (Epple and Romano, 2008 ).
2 production function satis…es an (unrealistic) separability assumption. In general a trade-o¤ is inevitable and we therefore propose some compromise solutions.
One family of solutions rewards schools for good administration, but does not necessarily eliminate all pupil selection. The well-known value-added scheme is a special case. The other family avoids pupil selection, but does not necessarily reward schools with higher test scores. In section 3 we illustrate the empirical relevance of the trade-o¤ and simulate the incentives provided by the di¤erent compromise solutions with empirical data for Flanders (the northern part of Belgium). Section 4 concludes.
Accountability and incentives
We construct a simple model to show the incompatibility between on the one hand creating incentives for higher test scores and on the other hand avoiding incentives for pupil selection. To bring the key trade-o¤ into focus we start from the most favorable informational assumptions. We assume that su¢ cient data are available at the pupil level, as it is already well known that informationally less demanding accountability schemes cannot su¢ ciently correct for di¤erences in pupil characteristics (Meyer, 1997; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003) . Furthermore the selection of relevant pupil test scores and its aggregation (over di¤erent dimensions and pupils) into a cardinal and comparable indicator of school output is assumed to be settled (Cawley et al., 1999; Neal, 2008) . We also neglect the problem that school output measures are typically less reliable for small schools (Kane and Staiger, 2002) . Introducing these optimistic assumptions strengthens our impossibility result.
Preliminaries
The agreed measure of school output y 2 R is a function of school variables denoted by x 2 X; we write y = f (x). School variables consist of administration variables a 2 A and background variables b 2 B; we write x = (a; b), and de…ne the set X as the product A B. The classi…cation of a school variable as an administration or background variable is simple in theory. Endogenous variables that can be chosen by a school are attributed to administration; for example, the number of instruction hours, the level of remediation per pupil, and teacher motivation. Exogenous variables-variables that cannot be changed 3 by a school, but whose distribution at school can possibly be altered by selection mechanisms-belong to background; think of initial test scores, innate intelligence, and socioeconomic status of the pupils. Because most background variables are directly related to characteristics of the pupils, we use the term pupil background from now on.
The distinction between administration and background variables is less evident in empirical applications. Usually, the function f will be estimated via a standard explanatory model of test scores; see, e.g., Hanushek (2006) for an overview. A typical estimation includes observable characteristics, unobserved pupil and school e¤ects, and idiosyncratic error terms. Each of these right-hand side variables, observed and unobserved, must be classi…ed as an administration or a background variable. We will make a speci…c proposal in the next (empirical) section, but for the theoretical analysis it is su¢ cient to assume that some classi…cation is made.
We do not explicitly model school behavior (as, e.g., in Barlevy and Neal, 2011 ). The output function f is a reduced form equation that re ‡ects the educational production technology. We assume that f does not change under the incentive scheme. Changes in subsidies can of course motivate schools to be more e¤ective, otherwise the whole exercise would be meaningless. Changes may also induce incentives for pupil selection. Both e¤ects are fully captured in our framework by a change in the administration variables in a and pupil background characteristics in b.
We use subscripts j = 1; 2; : : : ; J to denote schools. A school subsidy scheme s : X J ! R J maps all information about the di¤erent schools x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x J ) into a vector of school subsidies s(x) = (s 1 (x); s 2 (x); : : : ; s J (x)). We look for a subsidy scheme that rewards schools for better output without providing incentives to attract or refer pupils with speci…c characteristics. What form should s(x) take? To answer this question, we do not start from an overall social objective function, but we model the requirements to be imposed on the school …nancing scheme directly in terms of two basic principles. These principles, and some of the results later on, are inspired by the theory of fair allocation (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008 , for an overview) and its application to health insurance (Schokkaert et al., 1998; Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2004) . We …rst formulate the basic principles, then show that they are incompatible in general, and …nally introduce some possible compromise solutions. 4 
Getting the incentives right
We start with the reward principle. A change in the output of a school that is only caused by a change in administration should change the school subsidy in the same direction. Let (a; b) be the decomposition of x (with obvious notation).
incentives for good administration: For all x; x 0 in X J , for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; J, if a k = a 0 k for each school k 6 = j, and b = b 0 , then there exists a strictly increasing function , with (0) = 0, such that
The axiom does not say that the subsidy increase should be su¢ ciently large to make the cost (if any) of the change in administration worthwhile. It simply says that good administration should be …nancially encouraged. It can be interpreted as a minimalist necessary condition for e¢ ciency. For later use, if the subsidy functions s j and the output function f are di¤erentiable with respect to some administration variable a jk -an element in a j = (: : : ; a jk ; : : :)-then the axiom relates the marginal subsidy to the marginal output, or
for all pro…les and schools, with as de…ned before.
We now turn to pupil selection. Changes in the background of pupils without changes in administration e¢ ciency should not be rewarded in the funding scheme. Otherwise schools would have an incentive to attract or refer pupils with a speci…c background.
no incentives for pupil selection: For all x; x 0 in X J , for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; J, if a = a 0 , and
The principle clearly wipes out all …nancial incentives for pupil selection. In general such pupil selection is undesirable, as it may lead to unequal treatment of pupils within schools, to segregation, and to restrictions on the freedom of choice of pupils and parents. Note however that a normative trade-o¤ can arise if the segregation or integration of pupils over schools would increase average school output. Incentives for pupil selection could then be desirable from an e¢ ciency point of view. We will come back to this issue when we discuss compromise solutions that allow for pupil selection. Given di¤erentiability with respect to a pupil background variable b jk -an element in b j = (: : : ; b jk ; : : :)-the axiom imposes no subsidy changes at the margin, or
for all pro…les and schools.
Performance incentives create selection incentives
The two principles seem minimal requirements to be imposed if the aim is to create incentives for good administration and to avoid pupil selection at the same time. It is therefore striking that it is not possible to design a funding scheme that satis…es both principles in general, i.e., for all possible output functions f .
This impossibility result is well known (in many variants) in the social choice literature (Fleurbaey, 2008 ). Yet it remained largely unnoticed in the literature on school accountability. Meyer (1997) is the only one, as far as we know, that has drawn attention to the fact that schools cannot be ranked unambiguously according to performance, if the e¤ect of background variables on output di¤ers between them, but he did not integrate this observation in a general theoretical framework. 2 We provide a simple proof of the incompatibility between the two incentive axioms. We focus on an arbitrary school, keeping information on all other schools constant. We suppress subscripts, and, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote the output and the subsidy of the school by f (a; b) and s(a; b). Let b 2 B = R be an index of pupil background at the school. a to a 0 , ceteris paribus, then we go from situation 2 to 3 with a lower output.
The axiom incentives for good administration requires a lower subsidy 2 Moreover, Meyer (1997) claims that the empirical relevance of his observation is limited because "the assumption that slopes do not vary across schools is often a very reasonable assumption." In the next section, we falsify this claim with Flemish data. Proposition 1 has to be interpreted carefully: the general impossibility result only holds if we look for a subsidy scheme satisfying both axioms for all possible output functions f . It is obvious that the incompatibility disappears in Figure   1 if the lines would not intersect. Proposition 2 generalizes this observation (a proof can be found in the appendix). The intuition is easy. The separability condition in Proposition 2 allows to unambiguously classify schools according to the performance index h(a): a higher index corresponds with a higher output, irrespective of the pupils'background.
If we de…ne each subsidy s j (x) to be a strictly increasing function of the performance index h(a j ) only, then both requirements will be satis…ed by the resulting subsidy scheme.
It is an empirical question whether this separability condition is satis…ed by the data. It is implicitly imposed by the simple linear models that are often used to estimate educational production functions. However, proposition 1 suggests that falsely assuming a linear form may have undesirable consequences in terms of school administration and pupil selection. It is therefore important not to simply assume separability, but to test if it holds. In our empirical illustration we discuss a case where it is strongly rejected. 7
Compromise solutions
If there is a con ‡ict between the two principles, we have to formulate compromise solutions. We can keep the incentives for good administration intact, but then we may introduce incentives for selecting pupils with a certain background. Or we can make sure that we avoid selection, but then the incentives to improve pupil learning can be very di¤erent for di¤erent pupils and may even become negative.
For ease of exposition, we suppress in our notation the dependency of the subsidies on the pro…le x. We use linear subsidy schemes from now on and write the per pupil subsidy for school j as
with e y j the (possibly corrected) output of school j that will be de…ned later on. In this section we leave the choice of constant and slope open. A natural choice would be to choose constant so as to satisfy the budget constraint of the regulator, and slope so as to guarantee a minimal subsidy to all schools.
This is the approach that will be followed in the empirical application, but for the theoretical analysis the choice of constant and slope is irrelevant.
Before we propose two families of compromise solutions, we discuss two benchmark subsidy schemes: per capita (P C) and uncorrected output (U O)
funding. In many countries school funding is simply per capita, i.e.,
A per capita scheme does not provide any incentives, neither for good administration, nor for pupil selection. An uncorrected output scheme fully rewards schools for output increases, without any correction for pupil background. The subsidy is equal to
The scheme gives incentives for good administration, because changes in administration that lead to higher output clearly will be rewarded. Assuming di¤er-entiability we obtain
8 and, given that slope > 0, condition (1) is indeed satis…ed. For the same reason however, also changes in background that lead to higher output will be rewarded.
Schools have an incentive to attract pupils with a background that is 'favorable' to output. Given di¤erentiability the subsidy change is equal to
violating condition (2) if @f (a j ; b j )=@b jk di¤ers from zero.
A …rst family of compromise solutions is based on a reference administration (RA) level, denoted e a, to correct output. De…ne corrected output as e y j = y j f (e a; b j ); the subsidy is then equal to
Schools are rewarded if their output is higher than the hypothetical output that would result if the school had chosen the reference administration level, ceteris paribus. The scheme creates incentives for good administration, because changes in administration that are favorable to output translate into higher subsidies. Assuming di¤erentiability of the reference scheme, the incentive for good administration @s RA j =@a jk is exactly equal to the one for uncorrected output in equation (6) . Reference administration schemes may lead to selection incentives, however. The selection incentive depends on
and will typically be di¤erent from zero, thus violating (2). But, comparing (7) and (9), if the derivatives @f (a j ; b j )=@b jk and @f (e a; b j )=@b jk are similar in magnitude, then j@s RA j =@b jk j will be smaller than j@s U O j =@b jk j. Summing up, reference administration schemes provide similar incentives for good administration compared to uncorrected output schemes, but can be expected to provide lower incentives for pupil selection.
The mirror image of the previous scheme is to choose a reference pupil background (RB), say e b. If we de…ne corrected output as e y j = f (a j ; e b), then the school will be rewarded on the basis of the hypothetical output that would arise if its actual administration were applied to the reference pupil population. This yields
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The subsidy s RB j does not depend on the school background b j anymore, which removes selection incentives. With di¤erentiability, we indeed get @s RB j =@b jk = 0 as required by (2) . But actual output does not appear in equation (10) either.
We can immediately derive that
and condition (1) is no longer satis…ed if the change in the true output, being @f (a j ; b j )=@a jk , has a di¤erent sign compared to the change in the hypothetical output @f (a j ; e b)=@a jk . Because we expect that the signs of both derivatives often coincide, the reference background scheme will provide more incentives for good administration compared to a per capita scheme. Summing up, reference background schemes provide no incentives for pupil selection, as is the case in a per capita scheme, but in addition they can be expected to provide some incentives for good administration. Table 1 summarizes the di¤erent schemes and their properties, i.e., is the axiom satis…ed, how large do we expect the incentives to be, and for how many schools will the axioms be satis…ed? Per capita schemes do not give incentives for good administration nor incentives for pupil selection to any school.
Uncorrected output schemes give both incentives to all schools. We expect the reference schemes to do better. More precisely, reference administration schemes outperform the uncorrected output schemes, because they give the same incentives for good administration to all schools, but with a lower incentive for pupil selection. Reference background schemes outperform per capita schemes, because they provide no incentives for pupil selection, but incentives for good administration to some schools. Table 1 While we expect reference administration and reference background schemes to be better than the simple benchmark schemes, they also require more information. More importantly, the extra information required by the schemes in equation (8) and (10) is also di¤erent. To implement these schemes, the regulator must have (an estimate of) the educational production function f . In addition, a reference administration scheme requires information about output y j and background variables b j , while a reference background scheme needs information about the administration variables a j . These di¤erent requirements 10 may have practical consequences. A reference background scheme o¤ers scope for strategic behavior, e.g., increasing instruction time without any real results.
Even worse, it may create incentives for misreporting variables, like instruction time, that are di¢ cult to verify. Strategic behavior is less problematic in a reference administration scheme. Test scores are collected in a standardized way and background variables typically consist of pupil characteristics that can (more) easily be controlled by the regulator.
A …nal note. The reference administration and reference background schemes are "families" of solutions, since we obtain another scheme for each speci…c choice of reference. The implications that have been described in this section hold for the complete family, but this does not mean that the choice of reference values is irrelevant. We will return to this issue in our empirical illustration.
Empirical illustration
For our empirical application we used the data collected in Flanders (the north- . 3 Other pupil data include the gender of the pupil, the language they speak with each of the parents, and the education level of the parents. 4 Classroom data consist of the total experience of the teacher, the class size, the instruction time for mathematics, and the number of teachers in a class. We also include the average initial test score of the peers, de…ned as all pupils in the same class. Table 2 provides a description of all variables.
Table 2
We restrict ourselves to schools with at least 10 pupils tested in each grade.
We have 5817 pupil-time observations-2239 pupils appearing in both grades, 628 in grade 1 only, and 711 in grade 2 only-distributed over 111 schools. 3 The math tests consists of between 40 and 80 questions (depending on the grade). The score distributions are well-behaved, showing no ‡oor and only limited ceiling e¤ects. 4 Note that Dutch is the o¢ cial language in Flanders.
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The main reason for attrition and replenishment is student retainment. We come back to this potential source of selection bias. Tables 3a and 3b contain summary statistics for the pupil and classroom data. 
with u i a 'random' pupil-level e¤ect, v j a '…xed' school level e¤ect, and w ijt an idiosyncratic error term. The speci…cation (12) Table 4 Table 4 reports estimates of the parameters in equation (12) . 6 The initial test score plays an important role in all models. Its coe¢ cient is rather robust 5 The selection correction model assumed random (rather than …xed) school e¤ects, leading to a so-called multilevel model. An attempt with …xed school e¤ects did not converge, probably due to the high number of dummies in the selection equation. 6 We add a dummy 'missing'to each covariate group (to limit the reduction in total sample size). We do not report the corresponding estimates which are, as expected, never signi…cant. 
Testing separability
A linear speci…cation is common in the literature on educational production functions. For the derivation of a …nancing scheme however, it is essential to test explicitly whether the separability assumption in proposition 2 holds. To do so, we split the observables z ijt into administration and background variables, denoted z a;ijt and z b;ijt . It is natural to assign variables at the class and school level-including the school-speci…c constant, but excluding the peer variable-to administration. All other variables-the pupil-level variables, the time dummy, and the peer variable-are classi…ed as background. To test separability we generalize (12) , allowing the pupil background coe¢ cients to vary over schools, i.e.,
For the purpose of illustration, we de…ne school output as the expected average pupil output. If a bar denotes an average (with the subscript indicating at which level the average is taken) and a hat indicates an estimate, then school output is equal to
where y j is the average test score in school j. Since the slope coe¢ cients b b;j tell us how pupils with a certain background perform at school j, it is natural to assign these coe¢ cients to administration. 7 We then get:
pure administration mixture
The non-linear terms in b 0 b;j z b;j mix administration and background. They are crucial to test the separability condition in proposition 2. More precisely, separability is satis…ed if the slope coe¢ cients b b;j are the same for all schools. Table 5 summarizes the separability tests based on model (13).
Table 5
The 'equal slope'-hypothesis is statistically rejected, for each background variable separately as well as for all background variables jointly. The theoretical consequences of this non-separability have been described before. Incentives for good administration may create incentives for pupil selection and, vice-versa, removing incentives for pupil selection may create incentives for bad administration. We now turn to the empirical relevance of this incompatibility. In particular, we will check to what extent the di¤erent subsidy schemes de…ned above satisfy the principles of incentives for good administration and no incentives for pupil selection. 7 To avoid confusion, we stress that the subscript b in the estimated slope vector b b;j indicates that it is a slope vector for the background variables. Still, these background slopes are at the school level and therefore classi…ed as administration variables. 14 
The trade-o¤ in practice
Recall the linear subsidy scheme de…ned in equation (3) . Let us …rst operationalize its di¤erent interpretations within the context of the non-separable model (13) . For this empirical application we have to specify the constant and the slope. The constant can be …xed by introducing the budget constraint faced by the regulator, i.e., by imposing that the average subsidy per pupil has to be equal to the available budget per pupil. If we normalize the available budget to be 1 unit per pupil, the per-pupil subsidy at school j becomes
with e y the average (corrected) output. 8 To …x the slope, a natural constraint is to guarantee each school a minimal subsidy per pupil, say s, with 0 < s < 1. A minimal subsidy requirement imposes an upper bound on the slope:
With s …xed, equation (15) will yield a di¤erent upper bound for slope, depending on the subsidy scheme used. To ease the comparison of the results for the di¤erent schemes, we choose slope to be equal to the lowest upper bound over the di¤erent schemes. Taking s = 0:5, we get a coe¢ cient slope ( 0:4)
that is common to all schemes, but the minimal subsidy per pupil will di¤er slightly between the di¤erent schemes.
We can now provide a formula for each subsidy scheme. Denoting as before the reference levels by a tilde, we get (the derivations can be found in the appendix):
As noted before, the reference levels in reference administration and reference background models can be chosen. These choices will have di¤erent implications for incentives. In the empirical illustration, the reference levels for slopes e b and averages e z b are based on the distribution of the estimated coe¢ cients b b;j and the averages z b;j over the di¤erent schools. We choose the 5th percentile (low), the median (mid), and the 95th percentile (high).
It is instructive to compare these solutions with what could be described as the common practice of using a value added (V A) model. If one sticks to the (rejected) separable model
then school output is equal to
The part b
is usually considered to be the value-added of the school; see, e.g., Meyer (1997) . If we de…ne corrected output e y j as value added, the per pupil subsidy reduces to (see appendix)
Comparing this value-added scheme with the reference administration subsidy scheme immediately shows that the former is a special case of the latter in which the reference coe¢ cients e b are chosen to be the coe¢ cients b will not be very di¤erent from the median value for b b;j , the value-added scheme will have similar properties as the corresponding (median) reference administration scheme. It will create incentives for e¢ ciency, but also incentives for pupil selection.
To check whether these schemes satisfy our two basic principles, we consider two simulations, each for two background variables. Since it follows from the results in Table 4 that especially initial test scores and parental education strongly correlate with …nal test scores, we select these two variables for further analysis. The distribution of their slopes and averages over schools is given in Table 6 . 9 The simulation results are given in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. is zero by construction, the …rst principle (incentives for good administration) obviously requires that this policy should not lead to an increase in the school subsidy. Table 7 contains the e¤ects of the simulated change on the school subsidies per pupil for the di¤erent subsidy schemes and for both background variables. To interpret the numbers, recall that the subsidies are normalized to be 1 on average. So, -0.08 or 0.06 can be interpreted as a loss or a gain equal to 8% or 6% of the average school subsidy. We do not report the results for the per-capita scheme, because per-capita subsidies obviously do not respond to the simulated changes. Notice that all subsidy changes in the tables should be interpreted as short-term changes, i.e., assuming that other schools do not change policy. Table 7 shows that the RA schemes-including the value added scheme-and the uncorrected ouput scheme satisfy the reward principle. If output does not change, the subsidy does not change. However, this is not true for the reference background (RB) schemes, for which the value of s j depends on the choice of reference values and can be negative or positive. If one chooses a low value for the reference e z, the right-hand panel of Table 7 shows that 96% (resp. 100%) of the schools have an incentive to distort their e¤ort choices towards those with low initial test scores (parental education). If one chooses a high value for the reference e z, about 95% (100%) of the schools have an incentive to increase the slope coe¢ cient for initial test scores (parental education).
The problem of the RB schemes is in fact more severe. Recall that the regulator can only apply these RB schemes, if she gets the necessary information about the administration variables from the schools themselves. This information is di¢ cult to verify and easy to manipulate. It is therefore clear that there is a real danger that the RB schemes are manipulated by the schools to receive a higher subsidy without a better performance.
A second simulation looks at the subsidy change resulting from a change in the pupil distribution of a school. We implement this hypothetical change by simulating the e¤ects of increasing or decreasing z b;jk by one standard deviation.
Ideally, no incentives for pupil selection requires that the subsidy should not change, since schools should not be rewarded for pupil selection if there is no increase in administration e¢ ciency. The results for the di¤erent subsidy schemes are given in Table 8 . With the reference background schemes, schools
are not rewarded when changing their pupil composition (without changing their administration e¢ ciency). However, the reference administration schemes and the uncorrected output scheme provide incentives for pupil selection. In case of uncorrected output for example, increasing the average initial test scores at school by one standard deviation may increase the subsidy up to 18% of the average school subsidy. The gains and losses in case of the reference administration schemes are typically smaller and depend on the reference slope. If the RA scheme is implemented with a low (high) reference value for the pupil background, almost all schools gain by attracting pupils with higher (lower) initial test scores or better (worse) parental education.
The tables suggest that choosing a median reference level minimizes the absolute magnitude of the selection incentives. Since this is very close to the value added (V A) model, the latter also performs satisfactorily in this respect.
Moreover, the reference level will play a role for behavior and can now be used to steer selection incentives. A low reference implies that most schools bene…t from attracting stronger pupils, while a high reference implies that most schools gain from attracting weaker pupils. An intermediate level-as in the value added model-imply that some schools gain and other schools lose from attracting better students. Interestingly, this may lead to e¢ cient sorting. Schools with a higher slope than the reference slope perform better for stronger pupils and also have an incentive to attract the stronger pupils and refer the weaker ones; and schools with a lower slope than the reference slope perform better for weaker pupils and also get an incentive to attract them and to refer better pupils. Of course, stronger segregation of pupils will result. The simulation results clearly illustrate the trade-o¤ between di¤erent objectives that was already mentioned when we introduced the principle of no incentives for pupil selection.
Conclusion
Recent experiences have shown that introducing school accountability may create incentives for e¢ ciency. It may also have undesirable side-e¤ects, however, like pupil selection, even if test scores can be perfectly corrected for pupil characteristics. We have shown that a school …nancing scheme that rewards output also creates incentives for cream-skimming, unless the educational production function satis…es an (unrealistic) separability assumption. It is therefore necessary to consider explicitly the trade-o¤ between the two objectives of improving performance and avoiding selection. We discuss the pros and cons of di¤erent compromise solutions and we have shown how information from the empirical educational production literature can be integrated in a coherent normative framework.
The empirical relevance of this analysis is illustrated with data on Flemish primary schools, for which the separability assumption is strongly rejected. We have interpreted our axioms and results in terms of a funding scheme. This is not the only possible interpretation, however. One could as well argue that s(x) represents only a performance measure, rather than a subsidy. Our principles remain valid in this measurement interpretation-incentives for good administration could be rebaptized as "performance sensitivity" and no incentives for pupil selection as "correction for pupil characteristics"-and the impossibility result remains relevant in this setting. Even if the regulator is not willing to introduce accountability in the system (which may be the case in many European countries) and sticks to the idea of quality norms and control, the framework remains valid. It is natural to …nancially compensate 19 schools with a socially disadvantaged pupil population, as it is more di¢ cult for them to realize the required quality norms. In general however, it is not possible to compensate schools for their pupil population, while leaving the school autonomy to meet the quality criteria una¤ected. The current framework can therefore shed a light on this question as well.
Proof of proposition 2
A subsidy scheme can satisfy incentives for good administration and no incentives for pupil selection if and only if there exist functions g :
R B ! R and h : A ! R, with g strictly increasing in its …rst argument, such
If the separability condition holds, it is possible to de…ne a subsidy scheme s such that each school subsidy s j is a strictly increasing function of h (a j ) only.
Such a scheme satis…es both axioms. We show the opposite.
Consider a subsidy scheme that satis…es incentives for good administration and no incentives for pupil selection. We show that, for arbitrary administrations a; a 0 2 A and backgrounds b; b 0 2 B, we have
This would indeed allow to properly de…ne functions
and g will be strictly increasing in its …rst argument.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose equation (17) 
Applying no incentives for pupil selection twice, we obtain s(a; b) = s(a; b 0 ) and s(a 0 ; b) = s(a 0 ; b 0 ), and, subtracting both equations, we get:
Equation (18) and (19) are incompatible, a contradiction.
24
A derivation of the empirical subsidy schemes
The per-capita and uncorrected output schemes are straightforward. We discuss the reference administration, reference background and value added scheme. A subsidy scheme is de…ned as
with the slope de…ned by (15) for each scheme. We focus here on the di¤erence e y j e y.
We start from the empirical model
The RA models use a reference administration, say e a = (e z a ; e v; e b ), to de…ne the hypothetical output as
The average hypothetical output is equal to e y = y ( Starting from the same empirical model, the RB models replace z b;j by a reference background e b = e z b to get
The OLS estimate for b v j is
and we can rewrite the hypothetical output as
The average is given by e y j = y b Finally, for the value-added (VA) model we have
with the OLS estimate of v
Plugging in the OLS estimate, corrected output becomes
Averaging the corrected output, we get
and the di¤erence e y j e y indeed reduces to Table 2 . 
